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Abstract
We consider a continuous time dynamic pension funding model in a defined benefit plan of an employment system. The
benefits liabilities are random, given by a geometric Brownian process. Three different situations are studied regarding the
investment decisions taken by the sponsoring employer: in the first, the fund is invested at a constant, risk-free rate of interest;
in the second, the promoter invests in a portfolio with n risky assets and a risk-free security; finally, it is supposed that the
rate of return is stochastic. Modelling the preferences of the manager such that the main objective is to minimize both the
contribution rate risk and the solvency risk, we study cases where the optimal behavior leads to a spread method of funding.
JEL classification: G23; G11
Subj. classification: E13; B81
Keywords: Defined benefit pension fund; Contribution rate risk; Solvency risk; Asset allocation; Stochastic control
1. Introduction
The dynamically optimal management of defined benefit pension plans has considerable economic interest, due
to the great importance that the world of pensions provision has acquired in financial markets.
In this paper we analyze the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation decisions for a manager of a defined
benefit pension plan who wishes to keep the fund as close as possible to prescribed targets. These targets are fixed by
actuarial cost methods, allowing an ideal contribution rate—the normal cost—and an ideal fund level—the actuarial
liability—to be defined. These ideal levels guarantee the benefits promised to members incorporated to the pension
plan over time. However, the existence of uncertainty in some elements of the plan or in the rate of return of the
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assets of the fund can cause the evolution of the plan to be quite different from the initially designed valuation. Hence
the contribution rate must be the normal cost modified by a suitable supplementary cost reflecting the disturbances.
The supplementary cost is chosen by the promoter with the aim of bringing the expected value of the unfunded
actuarial liability to zero. The instruments used by the manager to reach the objectives are the contribution rate and
investment earnings.
Along the lines of Haberman (1993), Haberman and Sung (1994), Haberman (1997), Josa-Fombellida and
Rincón-Zapatero (2001), we suppose that the aim of the controller is to minimize a combination of the contri-
bution rate risk and the solvency risk. The former represents the size of deviation of contributions from the normal
cost and is related with the stability of the plan. The latter risk is an indicator of the plan’s safety, measuring devia-
tions of the fund from the actuarial liability. The model is considered on an unbounded horizon and with a positive
discount rate, meaning that the sponsor is more worried about the short-term than with the long run behavior of the
fund.
Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2001) considered the case of a constant value for the benefits, in a context
closely related with the framework pioneered by Merton (1971) for optimal consumption and portfolio selection.
That paper found that the optimal behavior of the controller leads to a spread method of funding if the technical rate of
actualization of the actuarial liability equals the risk-free rate of return. With a spread method the supplementary cost
is proportional to the unfunded actuarial liability, in such a way that the corrections made in the rate of contribution
to the normal cost are small when the fund is close to the target. Furthermore, it enjoys good stability properties.
This is why spread methods have became popular with professionals and institutional agents.
Haberman and Sung (1994) considered a similar model in discrete time, on a finite horizon both in deterministic
and stochastic frameworks. These authors do not contemplate investment as an instrumental variable, but all the
fund assets are invested at a random rate of return. Another difference with our paper is that they consider constant
benefits, whereas in our case we allow stochastic benefits.
Other related papers are O’Brien (1987), Boulier et al. (1995, 1996), Cairns (1995, 1996, 2000), Owadally and
Haberman (1999), Vigna and Haberman (2001), Taylor (2002), Chang et al. (2003). Our paper extends the previous
analysis incorporating a source of uncertainty in the benefit outgo, supposing that the benefits are given by a
geometric Brownian motion. O’Brien (1987) analyzes a stochastic optimal control problem, where the uncertainty
in the benefits is modelled in a quite different way. This author makes a linear approximation to the exponential fund
model, see Bowers et al. (1986), to retain analytical tractability of the problem. However, no investment decisions
are available for the manager, who wishes to maintain a constant fund ratio (with respect to the actuarial liability),
and penalizes fluctuations of the contribution rate from zero.
Our paper contemplates three different situations which are studied regarding the investment decisions taken by
the sponsoring employer: (i) in the first, the fund is invested at a constant rate of interest; (ii) the promoter invests in
a portfolio with n risky assets and a risk-free security; (iii) finally, it is supposed that the rate of return is stochastic.
Note that the benefits are a non-tradable process, hence the market is incomplete and, furthermore, we also consider
the existence of correlation between the sources of uncertainty in the benefits and in the asset returns. However,
the consideration of the benefits as geometric Brownian motion is fundamental to our approach. The problem is
solved under particular assumptions-depending on the scenario-concerning the technical rate of actualization and
the evolution of the liabilities. These hypotheses are motivated by our intention to show that spread methods lead
to a minimization of risk in pension funding, even in a stochastic environment.
An outline of the paper and a summary of the main results are given next. Section 2 provides the definitions of
the main elements incorporated in a defined benefit pension plan of an employment system. The actuarial functions,
necessary for the valuation of the plan are also introduced, and we prove that when the benefits are given by a
geometric Brownian motion, the related actuarial functions are processes of the same type.
Section 3 considers that the fund is invested at a constant and deterministic rate of interest. We find that if the rate
of return of the bond is chosen as the valuation rate, then the optimal management of the fund is a spread method.
Section 4 presents a model with n+ 1 financial assets, where one of them is a bond. The controller can buy and sell
the assets without limitations, with the possibility of selling short and borrowing at the riskless rate of interest. The
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source of uncertainty of the benefits is correlated with that of the prices of the risky assets. This fact means, that in
order to find a spread method of funding, the rate of return of the bond plus a correction term due to the existence
of correlation must be chosen as the valuation rate. It can also be seen that in case (ii) the fund stabilizes faster than
in case (i), and with a lesser total contribution.
In Section 5, we suppose that the fund is totally invested in a single risky asset. This poses an interesting problem,
because it is not clear how the technical rate of actualization could be chosen to obtain a spread method.
Section 6 is devoted to establishing some concluding remarks. All the proofs are in Appendix A.
2. The pension model and preliminary results
The pension model under consideration refers to an aggregate pension fund whose funding scheme is of defined
benefit type. In a defined benefit plan the benefits are established in advance by the manager. Strictly speaking, this
can only be done in a deterministic setting. If there is uncertainty in some of the elements of the plan, as for example,
in its population, in the salary growth rate or in the appreciation of pension retirements, then the best the sponsor
can do is to model the uncertainty. The contributions are instruments used to maintain the fund within adequate
levels.
In this paper the actuarial valuation to estimate the main components of the plan are done at each instant of
time. We denote F(t) as the value of the assets of the fund at time t; C(t) is the contribution rate of the sponsor
needed to accrue the amount of the defined benefits at the moment of retirement; the defined benefits are denoted
by P(t); the normal cost for all participants by NC(t); the actuarial liability by AL(t); the unfunded actuarial
liability by UAL(t) = AL(t) − F(t) and the supplementary contribution rate amortizing UAL(t) at time t, by
SC(t) = C(t)− NC(t). The valuation of the plan is done with a constant rate of interest δ, called the technical rate
of interest.
Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2001) considered the values of P , NC and AL were constants. A more
realistic assumption is to suppose the existence of disturbances that affect the evolution of the benefits and hence
the evolution of the normal cost and the actuarial liability. To model this possibility, we consider a probability
space (Ω,F,P), whereF = {Ft}t≥0 is a complete and right continuous filtration generated by the one-dimensional
Brownian motion {B(t)}t≥0 and P is a probability measure on Ω. One of the more general hypotheses
about the behavior of P is to suppose that P is a path-continuous scalar Itoˆ process defined on
(Ω,F,P) as
P(t) = P0 +
∫ t
0
µ(P(s), s) ds+
∫ t
0
η(P(s), s) dB(s), t ≥ 0,
where P0 represents the initial liabilities. This formulation allows us to consider that the population of the plan is
subject to disturbances that cannot be completely anticipated by the sponsor.
Following Bowers et al. (1986), we introduce the hypothesis that the benefits accumulated by the worker through-
out his or her life are distributed according to the distribution function M, with an associated density function m.
For age x, the value M(x) represents the percentage of the actuarial value of the future benefits accumulated until
x. The support of m is the fixed interval [a, d], hence m(x) = 0, if x ≤ a or x ≥ d. We are supposing that all the
participants enter the plan at age a, whereas the common age of retirement is d.
Along the lines of the deterministic case, the stochastic actuarial liability and the stochastic normal cost are
defined as follows:
AL(t) =
∫ d
a
e−δ(d−x)M(x)E (P(t + d − x)|Ft) dx, NC(t) =
∫ d
a
e−δ(d−x)m(x)E (P(t + d − x)|Ft) dx
for every t ≥ 0, where E(·|Ft) denotes conditional expectation with respect to the filtration associated to the
standard Brownian motion {B(t)}t≥0. Thus, to compute the actuarial functions at time t, the manager makes use of
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the information available up to that time, in terms of the conditional expectation. The information in resumed in
the corresponding element of the filtration, Ft . Since P is a diffusion process, it satisfies the Markov property (see
Øksendal (1998)), hence conditional expectation with respect to the filtration equals conditional expectation with
respect the current values of P at time t. It is plausible to think that in the task of computing the ideal values of the
fund, the information given by the evolution of the random source will be used.
For analytical tractability, we will need a more concrete specification for P . A typical way of modelling P in the
certain case is to postulate exponential growth, see Bowers et al. (1986). The stochastic counterpart is to consider
the benefits outgo as a geometric Brownian motion. This is the content of the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis A. The benefits P satisfies
dP(t) = µP(t) dt + ηP(t) dB(t), t ≥ 0,
where µ ∈ R and η ∈ R+. The initial condition P(0) = P0 is a random variable that represents the initial liabilities.
Hence we are supposing that the benefits increase or decrease on average at a constant exponential rate. The
behavior of the actuarial functions AL and NC are then given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Under Hypothesis A there are constants ψAL and ψNC such that AL = ψALP and NC = ψNCP .
Furthermore, ψNC = 1 + (µ− δ)ψAL and the identity (δ− µ)AL(t)+ NC(t)− P(t) = 0 holds for every t ≥ 0.
From the proposition we deduce that
dAL(t) = µAL(t) dt + ηAL(t) dB(t), AL(0) = ψALP0, (1)
and also dAL(t) = (δAL(t)+NC(t)− P(t)) dt + ηAL(t) dB(t). This is an analogous equation to that appearing in
the deterministic case, see Bowers et al. (1986).
3. Optimal funding with safe investment
A first approximation to the management of a defined benefit pension plan is to consider that the whole wealth
of the fund is invested at a safe and constant rate of return. This case is studied here, where the unique source of
uncertainty comes from the benefits outgo. Although the results could be obtained from the next section, we analyze
this case separately to isolate more clearly the effects of investment decisions and to facilitate comparison.
We consider a bond S0 verifying
dS0(t) = rS0(t) dt, S0(0) = 1,
where r > 0 is the constant rate of interest.
The evolution of the fund is given by the ordinary differential equation
dF(t) = (rF(t)+ C(t)− P(t)) dt, t ≥ 0 (2)
with initial condition F(0) = F0 > 0.
In the control problem considered here, the only instrument of the manager is the rate of contribution C, that we
suppose is a measurable adapted process with respect to {Ft} satisfying∫ ∞
0
|C(s)| ds <∞ a.s. (3)
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We will use Proposition 2.1 and the definition of the supplementary cost to eliminate the processes P and NC in the
control problem. The equality (δ− µ)AL + NC − P = 0 allows us to write (2) as
dF(t) = (rF(t)+ SC(t)+ NC(t)− P(t)) dt = (rF(t)+ SC(t)+ (µ− δ)AL(t)) dt, t ≥ 0. (4)
Let us now turn to the preferences of the controller. We assume that he or she wishes to minimize a convex
combination of the contribution rate risk and the solvency risk. Thus, the objective functional to be minimized over
the class of admissible controls AF0,AL0 , is given by
J((F0,AL0); SC) = EF0,AL0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(κSC2(t)+ (1 − κ)(AL(t)− F(t))2) dt. (5)
Note that we choose SC as the control variable instead ofC, leading to an equivalent control problem. Here,AF0,AL0
is the set of measurable processes SC = C−NC, whereC satisfies (3), andF and AL satisfy (4) and (1), respectively.
In the above, EF0,AL0 denotes conditional expectation with respect to the initial conditions (F0,AL0).
The parameter κ, 0 < κ ≤ 1, is a weighting factor reflecting the relative importance for the employer of the two
different types of risks. Note that the specification (5) implies that the fund manager assigns the same importance
to over and under deviations of the fund’s assets and contributions from their respective targets. The recent paper
by Chang et al. (2003) considers the square of ratio deviation of the variables, plus linear terms in the performance
criterion function, in such a way that under-funding and over-contributing is more penalized than over-funding and
under-contributing.
An important issue is how to choose the technical rate of actualization δ. Given that there is a riskless rate of
interest r in the market, a rather natural selection is δ = r. This is better understood if a hypothetical situation
is considered where the sponsor borrows money to satisfy his or her liabilities. The rate of borrowing is r, so the
“correct” valuation of the debt is δ = r. Hence we impose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis B. The technical rate of actualization equals the riskless rate of interest, δ = r.
It turns out that, in this case, the structure of the problem becomes quite simple and the optimal solution involves
a spread method of funding. Of course, the problem could be easily solved for a different value of δ, but in this case
the optimal contribution rate is not proportional to the unfunded actuarial liability, UAL = AL − F .
The dynamic programming approach is used to solve the problem. To make the process work, some properties of
the value function need to be established. In particular, we prove that it is a solution to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
equation (HJB henceforth). The value function is defined as
Vˆ (F,AL) = min
SC∈AF,AL
{J((F,AL); SC) : s.t. (4), (1)}.
Since the problem is autonomous and the horizon unbounded, we may suppose that Vˆ is time independent. It is
clear that the value function so defined is non-negative and strictly convex.
The connection between value functions in optimal control theory (deterministic or stochastic) and optimal
feedback controls is accomplished by the HJB equation, see Fleming and Soner (1993). We thus have the following
result.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Hypotheses A and B hold. If the inequality
2µ+ η2 < ρ (6)
is satisfied, then the optimal contribution rate is given by
C∗ = NC + αFF
κ
UAL, (7)
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where αFF is the unique positive solution to the equation
α2FF + κ(ρ − 2r)αFF − κ(1 − κ) = 0. (8)
Remark 3.1. From (7) in Theorem 3.1, the optimal supplementary cost is proportional to the unfunded actuarial
liability: SC∗ = (αFF/κ)UAL∗. The form of the solution suggests that the optimal behavior of the manager in a
defined benefit pension plan, when he or she wishes to minimize the solvency and contribution risks, corresponds
to what is called in the literature the spread method of funding. This fact was first pointed out by Haberman and
Sung (1994) in a discrete time environment and corroborated by Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2001) in
continuous time. The spread method appears because of Hypothesis B.
Remark 3.2. From (A.2) in Appendix A and Arnold (1974, p. 139), we obtain
EF0,AL0F
∗(t)− EF0,AL0 AL(t) = (F0 − AL0) e(r−αFF/κ)t .
Therefore, if the inequality
αFF > κr (9)
holds, then the difference between the expected value of the fund and the expected value of the actuarial liability
converges to zero and from (7), the difference between the expected value of the contribution rate and the expected
value of the normal cost tends to zero.
The constant αFF/κ depends on κ, r and ρ. In fact, if r ≥ ρ condition (9) holds. When r < ρ, (9) implies that
κ <
1
1 + r(ρ − r) , (10)
where we have used (8). This inequality places a constraint between the impatience rate of the controller—whenever
it is greater than the rate of return of the bond—and the weight given to the objectives. It is clear that if ρ increases,
that is to say, the promoter is more concerned with the near future than with the long term, then the weight of the
solvency risk term has to diminish to stabilize the plan. The contribution rate thus increases with ρ.
4. Optimal funding with portfolio selection
In this section the management of the pension fund is modelled in the environment established in the above
sections, but the possibility for the manager to invest in risky assets is introduced. The sponsoring employer manages
the funding process by making a portfolio choice of n risky assets S1(t), . . . , Sn(t) and a bond S0(t), 0 ≤ t < ∞,
with dynamics given by the equations
dS0(t) = rS0(t) dt, S0(0) = 1, (11)
dSi(t) = Si(t)
bi dt + n∑
j=1
σij dWj(t)
 , Si(0) = si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (12)
Here bi andσij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n are positive constants. The vector (W0(t),W1(t), . . . ,Wn(t)) is an (n+1)-dimensional
standard Brownian motion defined on the probability space (Ω,G,P), where {Gt} denotes the completion of the
filtration σ{(W0(s),W1(s), . . . ,Wn(s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
We assume that bi > r, for each i = 1, . . . , n. Given that the benefits P are conditioned for the increase in salary
of the sponsoring employees, we suppose the existence of correlation qi ∈ [−1, 1] between the Brownians B and
Wi, for i = 1, . . . , n, which can be explained by the effects of salary on inflation and the effects of the latter on the
asset prices. This means that E(B(t)Wi(s)) = qi min(t, s) for i = 1, . . . , n and B(t) =
√
1 − q¯q¯W0(t)+ q¯W¯(t),
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where W¯(t) = (W1(t),W2(t), . . . ,Wn(t)) and q¯ = (q1, q2, . . . , qn). When q¯q¯ = 1 the risk in the benefits
outgo cannot be eliminated by trading in the financial market.
The matrix (σij) is denoted by σ and the market price of risk, σ−1(b¯− r1¯), by θ¯, where b¯ = (b1, . . . , bn) and 1¯
is a (column) vector of 1’s. We will suppose that the symmetric matrix Σ = σσ is positive definite. λi(t) denotes
the quantity of the fund invested by the promoter in the asset i, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The quantity F −∑ni=1 λi is invested
in the risk-free bond. There are no bounds on these variables. A negative value of λi means that the promoter is
selling short the corresponding stock. If
∑n
i=1 λi is greater than the value of the fund, then the manager is borrowing
money at rate r to invest in the stocks. λ¯(t) denotes (λ1(t), . . . , λn(t)).
A portfolio process or trading strategy λ¯(t) is an Rn-measurable process adapted to {Gt} such that∫ ∞
0
λ¯(s)λ¯(s) ds <∞ a.s. (13)
We suppose that changes in the fund level derive solely from changes in the asset prices, the interest of the bond,
the contribution rate and the benefits. Consequently:
dF(t) =
n∑
i=1
λi(t)
dSi(t)
Si(t)
+
(
F(t)−
n∑
i=1
λi(t)
)
dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ (C(t)− P(t)) dt. (14)
By (11), (12) and (14) we obtain that the fund amount satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:
dF(t) =
(
rF(t)+
n∑
i=1
λi(t)(bi − r)+ C(t)− P(t)
)
dt +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λi(t)σij dWj(t)
with initial condition F(0) = F0. Using Proposition 2.1, this can be rewritten as
dF(t) =
(
rF(t)+
n∑
i=1
λi(t)(bi − r)+ SC(t)+ (µ− δ)AL(t)
)
dt +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λi(t)σij dWj(t). (15)
It is important to remark that the model describes an incomplete market, because the stochastic benefits P cannot
be traded in the security market and therefore the manager cannot hedge the inherent risk.
We shall now proceed to establish the problem of the funding process management when the possibility of
diversification in the investment is considered. As in Section 3, the problem is stated in terms of the fund wealth
and the actuarial liability as the state variables. Naturally, we now add new control variables, given by the vector of
investment decisions, to the supplementary cost.
The elements in the class of admissible controls,AF0,AL0 , are Markovian stationary pairs (SC, λ¯) adapted to the
filter {Gt}t≥0, satisfying (3) and (13), such that (1) and (15) admit a unique solution, which is Gt-measurable with
continuous paths.
To solve the problem stated above the same steps are followed as in the section above. The value function is
defined as
Vˆ (F,AL) = min
(SC,λ¯)∈AF,AL
{J((F,AL); (SC, λ¯)) : s.t.(15), (1)}.
Our aim is to prove that even in this framework, the solution of the problem is again, as in Section 3, a spread
method of funding. For this to be the case, the following assumption needs to be imposed on the actualization rate.
Hypothesis B′. The technical rate of actualization satisfies δ = r + ηq¯θ¯.
In contradistinction to Hypothesis B, the risk-free rate r is now modified to get rid of the sources of uncertainty
due to the investment in risky assets that, we suppose, are correlated with the Brownian motion driving the benefits
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process. In fact, if there is no correlation, or if η = 0, then δ = r. Here are some arguments justifying the hypothesis,
using asset valuation techniques, which are based on the certainty equivalent growth rate approach. We mainly follow
Constantinides (1978) and Shimko (1992, pp. 43–47). To simplify, consider only one worker of age x = x0 ∈ [a, d].
The promise to pay P(t) to the worker at the time of retirement x = d is valued by the sponsor by
e−δ(d−x0)E(P(t + d − x0)|Ft) = e(µ−δ)(d−x0)P(t),
as proven in Proposition 2.1. Now, for this valuation to be “correct”, that is to say, to be a risk-neutral valuation of
the liability, it must be the case that
µ− δ = −(r − α∗), (16)
where α∗ = µ − ηq¯θ¯ is known as the certainty equivalent growth rate of P . α∗ allows the growth rate of the
underlying process P to be adjusted and the expected value in a risk-neutral market to be calculated. From (16) we
obtain our Hypothesis B′, that is, δ = r + ηq¯θ¯.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Hypotheses A and B′ hold. If the inequality
2µ+ η2 < ρ (17)
is satisfied, then the optimal rate of contribution and optimal investment in the risky assets are given by
C∗ = NC + βFF
κ
UAL, (18)
λ¯∗ = Σ−1(b¯− r1¯)UAL + ησ−q¯AL, (19)
respectively, where βFF is the unique positive solution to the equation
β2FF + κ(ρ − 2r + θ¯θ¯)βFF − κ(1 − κ) = 0. (20)
Remark 4.1. Note that (18) implies, as in Section 3, that the supplementary cost is proportional to the unfunded
actuarial liability. However, the constant of proportionality is now higher than in the case where the sponsor invests
only in the bond. This can be checked computing the solutions of the respective equations defining αFF and βFF.
The explanation becomes from the existence of uncertainty in the financial assets. The disturbances in the fund due
to the evolution of the prices of the risky assets makes it more difficult to keep the solvency risk at zero, causing a
more severe adjustment in the contribution rate.
With reference to the optimal investment decisions, (19), we can distinguish two terms. The first is again propor-
tional to UAL, but the second is a correction term, depending on the risk parameters of the model and on AL. The
constant of proportionality in the first term is the so called optimal-growth portfolio strategy.
An interesting feature of the model is that the manager takes a greater risk when the wealth of the fund is far
below the actuarial liability than when it is closer. This behavior, which seems to be counterintuitive, was analyzed
by Cairns (2000). However, there is a rational explanation. The sponsor is concerned with the stabilization of the
funding process around the targets, because of their aim to reduce the risks inherent to the funding process. Given
that the mean returns of the risky assets are greater than the rate of return of the bond, the sponsor is willing to take
a greater risk to guide the fund towards the target. Please also note that, even in the case where the fund exactly
matches AL at some time, the investment in the risky assets is not null, as is the case when there is no uncertainty
in the benefits, see Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2001), or if there is no correlation.
Remark 4.2. From (A.5) in Appendix A and Arnold (1974, p. 139), we have
EF0,AL0F
∗(t)− EF0,AL0 AL(t) = (F0 − AL0) e(r−θ¯
θ¯−βFF/κ)t .
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Therefore, if the inequality
βFF > κ(r − θ¯θ¯) (21)
holds, then the difference between the expected value of the optimal fund and the expected actuarial liability
converges in the long term to zero. A similar comment applies to the contribution and the normal cost.
Inequality (21) is automatically fulfilled if r ≥ ρ + θ¯θ¯. However, when r < ρ + θ¯θ¯, it reduces to
κ <
1
1 + r(ρ + θ¯θ¯ − r) .
As can be seen, this is more restrictive than when the manager of the fund only invests in fixed rent, because θ¯θ¯ > 0.
Compare this with expression (10).
Remark 4.3. In the optimal solution (19), the manager borrows money at rate r to invest in risky asset i—that is to
say, λi > F∗—when the level of the fund is below kiAL, where the constant ki is defined as
ki = e¯iΣ
−1(b¯− r1¯)+ ηe¯iσ−q¯
1 + e¯iΣ−1(b¯− r1¯)
, e¯i = (0, . . . ,
i)
1, 0, . . . , 0)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The manager takes a short position in asset i—that is to say, λ∗i < 0—when the fund is
above the value k′iAL, where
k′i =
e¯iΣ
−1(b¯− r1¯)+ ηe¯iσ−q¯
e¯iΣ−1(b¯− r1¯)
> ki.
We can summarize the above in the following behavior for the optimal investment
λ¯∗ ≤ 0¯ ⇔ F∗ ≥ k′iAL, λ∗i ≥ F ⇔ 0 < F∗ ≤ kiAL, 0 < λ∗i < F ⇔ kiAL < F∗ < k′iAL.
That is, when the fund is over k′iAL, the manager is selling short in asset i. When the fund is below kiAL, the manager
is borrowing money at rate r. Observe that even in the case of over-funding, F∗ > AL, the optimal decision may
be to borrow money to invest in stocks. For this to be the case, it is necessary the existence of positive correlation.
To simplify matters, assume that there is only one stock and that qη/σ > 1. Then k1 > 1 and the inequality
AL < F∗ < k1AL could be plausible, indicating that the manager has to borrow money to invest in risky assets
even in the case of over-funding. Of course, this can only be due to a high value of the instantaneous volatility of
P with respect to that of the stock, and to the existence of a positive correlation.
We may wonder why the manager is going to invest in risky assets if he or she can attain the same objectives
of minimizing risks by investing in fixed rent and if the region of stability in the former case is smaller than in the
latter, as shown in Remarks 3.2 and 4.2. The reasons for doing so are contained in the two following results, where
we suppose that Hypothesis B holds in the fixed rent case and that Hypothesis B′ holds in the other case.
Corollary 4.1. If Hypothesis A holds, then the rate of convergence of the expected value of the fund to the expected
value of actuarial liability in the long run is greater when the manager invests both in the bond and risky assets
than when he or she invests only in fixed rent.
Hence, on average, the stabilization of the plan is faster with the selection of an adequate portfolio involving risky
assets and a constant bond, in contrast to the case of investing only at a fixed and deterministic rate of interest.
Another interesting question is to compare the total averaged contribution rate made by the sponsoring employees
through time, under the two types of management.
9
Corollary 4.2. If Hypothesis A, (9) and (21) hold, then, when F0 < AL0 the total expected value of the optimal
contribution rate is less when the manager invests in both the bond and risky assets than when he or she invests
only in fixed rent.
5. Optimal pension funding with stochastic rate of return
In this section we investigate what the optimal behavior of the pension manager is when there is no risk-free
asset. As noted by Cairns (2000), some pension funds only use cash for short-term liquidity and not as an asset to
invest in the long run. In general, funds use government bonds with fixed interest as low risk assets, but they are
not risk-free. In this situation, we can ask ourselves what the technical rate of actualization is that is chosen by the
actuaries, leading to a spread method of funding.
To simplify the model, let us consider that the whole wealth of the fund is invested in a single risky asset. This
case cannot be handled from results established in Section 4, but the model is as specified in that section, without
the bond S0 and with n = 1. Therefore, we now suppose that there is only one risky asset whose price is a geometric
Brownian motion
dS(t) = bS(t) dt + σS(t) dW1(t),
where b > 0 and σ > 0. The symbol W1 denotes a standard Brownian motion. Remember, however, that B is the
standard Brownian motion intervening in the evolution of the benefits. We suppose thatW1 andB are correlated, as in
Section 4. That is to say,E(B(t)W1(s)) = qmin(t, s), with−1 ≤ q ≤ 1. Hence we can writeB =
√
1 − q2W0+qW1,
where (W0,W1) is a standard Brownian motion defined on the corresponding probability space.
The behavior of the wealth of the fund is given by the stochastic differential equation
dF(t) = F(t)dS(t)
S(t)
+ (C(t)− P(t)) dt,
or
dF(t) = (bF(t)+ C(t)− P(t)) dt + σF(t) dW1(t), F(0) = F0 ≥ 0.
As we already know, Hypothesis A allows us to eliminate P and NC from the formulation
dF(t) = (bF(t)+ SC(t)+ (µ− δ)AL(t)) dt + σF(t) dW1(t). (22)
The payoff is again given by the quadratic expression (5). Note that the fund is completely invested in the risky
asset, so the only control variable is the supplementary cost.
The value function of the stochastic problem now becomes
Vˆ (F,AL) = min
SC∈AF,AL
{J((F,AL); SC) : s.t.(1), (22)},
where the class of admissible controls, AF,AL, is defined as in the previous sections.
Since our main objective is to show that an adequate selection of δ leads to a spread method of funding, the
following hypothesis is imposed.
Hypothesis B′′. The technical rate of valuation satisfies δ = b+ σ2 − ηqσ > 0.
Theorem 5.1. If Hypotheses A and B′ hold and if the inequality 2µ+ η2 < ρ is satisfied, then the optimal rate of
contribution is given by
C∗(F,AL) = NC + γFF
κ
UAL,
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where γFF is the unique positive solution to the equation
γ2FF + κ(ρ − 2b− σ2)γFF − κ(1 − κ) = 0.
Remark 5.1. As in the above sections, it is possible to obtain
EF0,AL0F(t)− a3EF0,AL0 AL(t) = (F0 − a3AL0) e(b−γFF/κ)t
with a3 = (γFF + κ(µ− δ))/(γFF + κ(µ− b)), and therefore γFF > κb implies
lim
t→∞ (EF0,AL0F(t)− a3EF0,AL0 AL(t)) = 0.
With a zero risk-free rate of interest, the expected value of the optimal fund minus the actuarial liability converges,
in the long run to zero if, and only if, the constant a3 = 1, that is to say, σ = ηq. This is an important difference
with respect to the case where there is a constant rate of return, where the expected value of the fund in the long
run exactly matches the expected value of the actuarial liability. The fact that in general it is not possible to attain
the expected value of the liabilities could be a consequence of Hypothesis B′′ and the use of a spread method of
funding. Some other selection of δ-maybe a non-constant one-could lead to an exact stabilization at the expense of
a more complicated method of funding.
6. Conclusions
We have studied the problem of pension funding in a defined benefit pension plan from the perspective of a
manager who wishes to keep the fund to prescribed targets with the aim of minimizing the solvency risk and
the contribution rate risk. The liabilities outgo is subject to disturbances influencing the evolution of the pension
management. We study three scenarios and determine the optimal behavior of the controller for each one. We
find that it is always possible to choose—in a rather natural way—the technical rate of actualization such that the
supplementary cost is proportional to the unfunded actuarial liability.
The paper shows that the expected value of the fund converges faster in the long run to the expected value
of the actuarial liability when the agent diversifies her or his investment. The investment in high return, high
risk assets decreases linearly as the fund increase towards the ideal value, but even when F exactly matches AL,
the optimal investment in risky assets is not null. This behavior implies taking more and more risks when the
level of the fund is low, but it demands selling the risky assets short when the fund is operating with a large
surplus.
An interesting question is to consider that the rate of return of the bond is not constant, but that it follows some
stochastic process, as proposed by Vasicek (1977) or Cox et al. (1985). This is the approach taken in the recent
papers of Boulier et al. (2001) and Deelstra et al. (2003) in defined contribution pension funds.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2.1. If Hypothesis A holds, then the benefits are given by
P(t) = P0 e(µ−η2/2)t+ηB(t), t ≥ 0.
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Therefore, for every x ∈ [a, d] and t ≥ 0 the following holds:
E(P(t + d − x)|Ft)= P0E(e(µ−η2/2)(t+d−x)+ηB(t+d−x)|Ft) = P0 eµ(t+d−x)E(e−η2/2(t+d−x)+ηB(t+d−x)|Ft)
= P0 eµ(t+d−x) e−(η2/2)t+ηB(t) = P0 eµ(d−x) e(µ−η2/2)t+ηB(t) = eµ(d−x)P(t).
The first equality holds because P0 is F0-measurable and the third because e−(η
2/2)s+ηB(s) is an Ft-martingale for
s ≥ t.
Therefore, defining
ψAL =
∫ d
a
e(µ−δ)(d−x)M(x) ds, ψNC =
∫ d
a
e(µ−δ)(d−x)m(x) ds,
the statement of the proposition follows. Finally, the relationship between ψAL and ψNC is obtained integrating by
parts in the second integral and taking into account the properties of M and that M ′ = m. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For the problem of optimal pension funding established in Section 3, the HJB equation
becomes:
ρV = min
SC
{(rF + SC + (µ− δ)AL)VF + µALVAL + 12 (η2)AL2VAL,AL + κSC2 + (1 − κ)(AL − F)2}.
(A.1)
If there is a smooth solution V of this equation, strictly convex with respect to (F,AL), then the minimizer value of
the supplementary cost rate is given by
ŜC(VF ) = −VF2κ ,
that is, Cˆ(VF ) = NC − VF/2κ. We first substitute this value in (A.1) and then we try a solution of the form
V(F,AL) = αFFF2 + αAL,ALAL2 + αF,ALFAL.
The following three equations are obtained for the above coefficients
α2FF + κ(ρ − 2r)αFF − κ(1 − κ) = 0, −αF,ALαFF+κ(µ+ r − ρ)αF,AL + 2κ(µ− δ)αFF − 2κ(1 − κ) = 0,
4κ(ρ − 2µ− η2)αAL,AL + α2F,AL − 4κ(µ− δ)αF,AL − 4κ(1 − κ) = 0.
The first equation is precisely (8), which admits a positive solution. Hypothesis B implies the equality −2αFF =
αF,AL and then, the second equation coincides exactly with the first one. Substituting these expressions in the third
equation and subtracting this from the first one, αAL,AL = ((ρ − 2µ)/(ρ − 2µ− η2))αFF ≥ αFF, assuring that V
is non-negative.
According to Fleming and Soner (1993), to prove that the solution we have found of Eq. (A.1) is in fact the value
function of the problem, it is sufficient to check that the transversality condition
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt
EF0,AL0V(F
∗(t),AL(t)) = 0
holds, where F∗ is the optimal fund wealth
dF∗(t) =
((
r − αFF
κ
)
F∗(t)+
(αFF
κ
+ µ− r
)
AL(t)
)
dt, (A.2)
obtained after substitution in (4) of the expression for SC∗ given in (18). Since V is a homogeneous quadratic
polynomial in F and AL, it is necessary to calculate the expected values of (F∗)2, F∗AL and AL2 conditioned
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to a given pair (F0,AL0). Since AL is a geometric Brownian motion, EF0,AL0 AL2(t) = AL20 e(2µ+η
2)t
, hence
limt→∞ e−ρtEF0,AL0 AL2(t) = 0 if and only if (6) holds.
Following Arnold (1974, p. 140), the functions defined by g(t) = EF0,AL0(F∗ AL)(t) and h(t) = EF0,AL0(F∗)2(t)
satisfy the linear differential equations
g′(t) =
(
r − αFF
κ
+ µ
)
g(t)+
(
−r + αFF
κ
+ µ
)
ϕ(t), h′(t) = 2
(
r − αFF
κ
)
h(t)+ 2
(αFF
κ
+ µ− r
)
g(t)
with initial conditions g(0) = F0AL0 and h(0) = F20 , respectively and where ϕ(t) = EF0,AL0 AL2(t). Therefore
g(t) = (F0 − a1AL0)AL0 e(r−αFF/κ+µ)t + a1ϕ(t)
with a1 = (αFF+κ(µ−r))/(αFF+κ(µ−r+η2)). Assuming inequality (6) we have limt→∞e−ρtEF0,AL0(F∗AL)(t)
= 0 if and only if r−αFF/κ+µ < ρ hold. To prove this, note that the definition of αFF as the unique positive solution
of (8) implies r − αFF/κ < ρ/2. Taking into account (6) we obtain r − αFF/κ+ µ ≤ r − αFF/κ+ µ+ η2/2 < ρ.
On the other hand
h(t) = (F20 − 2F0AL0 + (2a1 − a1a2)AL20) e2(r−αFF/κ)t + 2g(t)− (2a1 − a1a2)ϕ(t)
with a2 = (αFF + κ(µ − r))/(αFF + κ(µ − r + η2/2)). Hence limt→∞ e−ρth(t) = 0 if and only if (6) and
2r − 2αFF/κ < ρ hold. Again the latter inequality is obtained from (8) and (6). This ends the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The HJB equation is now
ρV =min
SC,λ¯
{(rF + λ¯(b¯− r1¯)+ SC + (µ− δ)AL)VF + µALVAL + 12 λ¯ΣλVFF + 12η2AL2VAL,AL
+ ηALλ¯σq¯VF,AL + κSC2 + (1 − κ)(F − AL)2}. (A.3)
If there is a smooth solution V of the Eq. (A.3), strictly convex, then the maximizers values of the contribution rate
and the investment rates are given by
ŜC(VF ) = −VF2κ ,
ˆ¯λ(VF , VFF, VAL,AL) = −Σ−1(b¯− r1¯) VF
VFF
− ηAL σ−q¯VF,AL
VFF
, (A.4)
respectively. The structure of the equation obtained once we have substituted this values for SC and λ¯ in (A.2),
suggests a quadratic homogeneous solution
V(F,AL) = βFFF2 + βAL,ALAL2 + βF,ALFAL.
Imposing this solution the following set of three equations is obtained for the coefficients
β2FF + κ(ρ + θ¯θ¯ − 2r)βFF − κ(1 − κ) = 0,
−βF,ALβFF + κ(µ+ r − ρ − θ¯θ¯ − ηq¯θ¯)βF,AL + 2κ(µ− δ)βFF − 2κ(1 − κ) = 0,
4κ(ρ − 2µ− η2)βAL,ALβFF + βFFβ2F,AL − 4κ(µ− δ)βF,ALβFF + κ(η2q¯q¯+ 2ηq¯θ¯ + θ¯θ¯)β2F,AL
− 4κ(1 − κ)βFF = 0.
Although it would be possible to solve the above equations with full generality, we wish to determine values of the
parameters of the problem leading to a spread method of funding. A view to the optimal contribution rate helps us
to find how to choose the technical rate of actualization δ. From (A.4)
SC = − 1
2κ
(2βFFF + βF,ALAL),
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hence the supplementary cost is proportional to the unfunded actuarial liability, if and only if, βF,AL = −2βFF. But
then, the first and second equations can have a solution, if and only if, δ = r+ ηq¯θ¯. Substituting these expressions
in the third equation and subtracting from the first one
βAL,AL = ρ − 2µ− η
2q¯q¯
ρ − 2µ− η2 βFF ≥ βFF,
assuring the non-negativity of V .
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we proceed by showing that the transversality condition holds. The reasonings
are very similar, the only change being the dynamics of the optimal fund, F∗
dF∗(t)=
((
r − θ¯θ¯ − βFF
κ
)
F∗(t)+
(
−r + θ¯θ¯ + βFF
κ
+ µ
)
AL(t)
)
dt
+ (−θ¯F∗(t)+ (θ¯ + ηq¯)AL(t)) dW(t). (A.5)
It is easy to show that
EF0,AL0(F
∗AL)(t) = (F0 − a1 AL0)AL0 e(r−θ¯θ¯−βFF/κ+µ−ηq¯θ¯)t + a1ϕ(t),
where a1 is a constant whose expression is not important for our purposes and where ϕ(t) = EF0,AL0 AL2(t). Hence
limt→∞ e−ρtEF0,AL0(F∗AL)(t) = 0, if and only if, both (17) and the inequality r− θ¯θ¯− βFF/κ+µ− ηq¯θ¯ < ρ
simultaneously hold. The latter condition follows from (17) and, by the definition of βFF, as the positive solution
of (20). To see this, in the first place we observe that
−ηq¯θ¯ ≤ η1¯θ¯ = 12 (θ¯θ¯ + η2 − (θ¯ − η1¯)(θ¯ − η1¯)) ≤ 12 θ¯θ¯ + 12η2
because −1 ≤ qi ≤ 1. Now (20) implies r − θ¯θ¯/2 − βFF/κ < ρ/2. These inequalities and (17) justify the claim.
On the other hand
EF0,AL0(F
∗)2(t)= (F20 − 2F0AL0 + (2a1 − a1a2 − a3)AL20) e2(r−(βFF/κ)−(θ¯
θ¯/2))t
+2EF0,AL0(F∗AL)(t)− (2a1 − a1a2 − a3)ϕ(t),
where a2 and a3 are constants. The arguments leading to limt→∞ e−ρtEF0,AL0(F∗)2(t) = 0 under the hypotheses
of the theorem are quite similar to that shown above. 
Proof of Corollary 4.1. With the explicit expressions of αFF and βFF, it is easy to verify that the rate of convergence
in the first case, |r − θ¯θ − (βFF/κ)|, is greater than in the second, which is given by |r − (αFF/κ)|. 
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Let us call case 1 the situation where there is no diversification in the investment and case
2 the contrary. Let Ci be the total expected value of the contribution rate in case i, i = 1, 2. Taking into account the
expressions for the expected value of the unfunded actuarial liability given in Remarks 3.2 and 4.2, we have
C1 − C2 = UAL0
κ
∫ ∞
0
(
αFF e
(r−αFF/κ)s − βFF e(r−βFF/κ−θ¯θ¯)s
)
ds
= κUAL0
(κr − αFF)(κ(r − θ¯θ¯)− βFF)
(r(βFF − αFF)+ αFFθ¯θ¯),
which is positive by the assumptions made on the parameters. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof is quite similar to that of Theorems 3.1 and 4.1, so it is omitted. 
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